Since the 1970s Australia has been one of the few countries that has progressively advanced the concept of gender pay equity. This achievement has largely been due the centralised, industrial tribunal based, wage fixing system. The wage rates created by industrial tribunals have been able to improve the pay of women workers due to their coverage of the workforce of an entire industry within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. State tribunals, in particular, have also been at the forefront of this development due to the adoption of new 'equal remuneration' wage fixing principles resulting in notable increases in award based wages for certain industries dominated by women workers. However, the capacity of state tribunals to continue to apply The paper discusses the impact on the new federal wage fixing system in the context of gender pay equity, and is divided into four parts. The first section briefly examines the history of pay (in)equity under the Australian tribunal based industrial relations system.
The second section overviews the recent developments at the state level focused on gender pay equity. The third section discusses recent cases in state wage fixing systems designed to remedy the gender based undervaluation of children's services employees. The fourth and final section discusses the implications of the new 'national' workplace relations laws in the context of gender pay equity in Australia.
Concept of Gender Pay Equity
A consistent finding in more recent research studies is that female domination of a workforce reduces relative pay. A review of the Australian studies examining the relationship between rates of pay and gender by Kidd and Ferko (2001, 71) notes that the evidence points to a gap of up to 20 per cent between the earnings of male and females, even when both sexes have 'similar productivity-related characteristics'. Their own analysis also found 'gender discrimination' in wage outcomes (Kidd and Ferko 2001, 86) .
A study by Kidd and Shannon (2002) projecting the size of the gender wage gap in Australia to the year 2031 found that only minor changes in gender pay differences would result despite projecting 'substantial' increases in both labour force participation and labour market experience of females.
At face value gender pay equity is a simple equation: men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value. Yet both sides of that equation involve complex issues of measurement. The first component of that equation -equal remunerationinvolves reviewing a variety of different employment forms and wage measures, spanning issues of full-time and part-time hours of work and the inclusion or otherwise of overtime and indirect forms of remuneration. The second component of the equation -equal value -leads to similarly vexed discussions as to what constitutes 'work value', and how it should be measured. Should the valuation of 'female' work (i.e., female dominated occupations and industries) require a comparison to 'male' work, or can an abstract standard be applied to address the 'undervaluation' of women's work on its own terms.
Over the last three decades Australian policy has approached this issue by way of labour law measures, an approach that has provided for collective remedies as pay increases are granted through a centralised, tribunal based, industry level industrial award system, with increases in award wages being granted on an industry basis. This approach stands in contrast to the measures available in the United Kingdom and North America where pay equity reform has been promoted through a series of human rights measures ill-suited to promoting aggregate remedies. 
Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal
Value but more particularly the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union.
European Union (EU) law forms part of domestic law in EU member states, although ambiguity still attends the precise relationship between EU and domestic law. While the European Court of Justice has delivered a number of judgements favourable to pay equity reform, equal pay legislation in the United Kingdom is primarily, although not exclusively, directed to individual claimants and limited to a single employer. Differential rates embedded in similarly skilled but different areas of work have remained resilient to change, a function of the absence of collective mechanisms and the inability of claimants to pursue cross-employer comparisons.
In the United States, ILO Convention 100 has not exercised a decisive impact on domestic pay equity reform as the United States is not a signatory to the Convention. The applicable measures comprise direct equal pay legislation and human rights legislation aimed at the prevention of discrimination. Direct statutory reform at a federal level was introduced in 1963 but the right to equal pay was limited to work involving equal skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions. Given the limitation activists sought a separate legislative path, the Civil Rights Act 1964 (US), a broadly based discrimination rights legislation. Contrary to expectations, the ability of applicants to utilise this pathway to pursue 'comparable worth' style applications to address women's disproportionate representation among low wage workers, has largely been denied.
Pay equity measures in Canada primarily reside in human rights legislation. Across federal and provincial jurisdictions, the measures are diverse and embrace both complaint based and proactive models. In broad terms the available measures hold that it is a discriminatory practice for employers to establish or maintain differences in wages between women and men employees in the same establishment who are performing work of equal value. The existing complaint based approaches are viewed as an inadequate platform for Canada to meet its international and domestic obligations. While the impact of proactive models has been assessed as positive, such measures have realised a narrower scope than expectedboth in the number of workplaces responding to the legislation and the average size of wage increases that had resulted from the measures (Pay Equity Task Force, 2004: 138-140, 418) .
Australian Award System
Returning to the measures in Australia it is now something of an irony that the historic differences in the pay received by men and women in Australia derive from the social assumptions that guided the decisions of industrial tribunals under the centralised industrial relations system. The wage fixation principle underpinning the origins of the award system was based on men working full-time as family 'bread winners'. Accordingly the initial construction of the minimum or basic wage in 1907 was based on the average weekly expenditure of an unskilled male worker with a wife and three children (CCCA 1907) . For a considerable period a rate of 54 per cent of the male award wage was the predominant benchmark for women, although female process workers were granted 66 per cent of the male award rate. With this guiding principle three models of female wages emerged: jobs where equal pay was granted as male employment would be under threat by women earning lower wages; jobs where women earned between 54-75 per cent of the male rate on both the basic wage and the skill margin, where a margin applied, and; jobs where women earned the same skill margin as men but, due to the concept of the family wage, received a lower basic wage (Short 1986, 316) .
The International Labour Organisation's Convention 100 resulted in a number of Australian states ultimately amended their industrial legislation to provide for equal pay, consistent with the Convention. New South Wales (NSW) was the first state to pass legislation, the Female Rates (Amendment) Act 1958 (NSW) which required the Industrial Commission of NSW and conciliation committees, in certain specified circumstances, to insert provisions for equal pay as between the sexes in awards and industrial agreements. 
State Pay Equity Inquiries and Wage Fixing Developments
Following a reference from the NSW Minister for Industrial Relations, Justice Glynn of the Industrial Relations Commission of NSW conducted a pay equity inquiry in 1998 (IRC of NSW 1998a; IRC of NSW 1998b; IRC of NSW 1998c) . The impetus for the Inquiry arose not only from the plateau in gender pay equity ratios but also the significance of the state system of industrial awards for women in paid work in NSW (IRC of NSW 1998a;
McCallum 1998). The Inquiry concluded that a new 'equal remuneration' wage fixing principle be adopted by the NSW Commission to 'make the industrial prescriptions fully effective in dealing with pay equity' (IRC of NSW 1998b, 164) . The Inquiry explicitly rejected the test of discrimination as the threshold for an equal remuneration claim, the test that is required by provisions in the federal Workplace Relations Act and which had been problematic in the only case to proceed to arbitration under the federal equal remuneration provisions (AIRC 1998). More broadly the Inquiry concluded that cases should not require the existence of, or proof of, gender causation and rejected any requirement for a causal connection between the rates of pay and some pre-existing circumstance connected to the gender of the workers concerned (IRC of NSW 1998b, 157-176) 
State Equal Remuneration Principles
The NSW Commission, in the absence of any legislative guidance, determined that the 'Equal Remuneration Principle' was confined to the Commission's award making and wage fixation functions, and inclusive only of the award rate of pay rather than a broader definition inclusive of remuneration as recommended by the Inquiry (IRC of NSW 2000).
The NSW Commission is able to take account of the actual rates paid irrespective of whether the payment is made under a individual or collective agreement, or as an 'over award' payment, for the purpose of properly fixing an award rate reflecting equal remuneration and other conditions of employment for men and women workers for work of comparable value. This provides that the Commission can take account 'over award' payments if they relate to work value considerations (such as skill, responsibility, qualifications and conditions).
The first application under the NSW equal remuneration principle concerned the design of classification and grading structures as well as the gender related undervaluation of the work of state government employed librarians, library officers and archivists. The case study submitted to the NSW Pay Equity Inquiry (Fruin 1998) (Lyons 1996) . Centre based services, long day care, are subject to regulations by state governments which set minimum standards for centre operation (NCAC 1993, iii) . From the mid-1990s long day care has also been subject to a national accreditation system administered by a federal government agency, the National Childcare Accreditation Council Inc (NCAC 1993 (NCAC , 2001 ). Adherence to the accreditation system, the Quality Improvement and Accreditation System (QIAS), is required for centres to have access to the federal government's fee subsidies (currently the Child Care Benefit).
Regulations also specify the minimum educational qualifications needed for staff to perform specific duties in centres. Progressively since the 1970s the number and type of qualifications relevant for employment in children's services have increased, to now include certificates, diplomas and advanced diplomas. The present range of qualifications adheres to the structure established by the Australian Qualifications Framework (AQF national code CHC50302). Nowadays, the majority of centres are for-profit businesses, a reversal of the situation in the 1970s and 1980s. Most centres are typical 'small' workplaces, employing less than 20 staff (Lyons 1996) , even though large 'corporate' employers have been a feature of the recent growth of the industry (e.g. ABC Learning
Centres Limited 2005). The 'child care' workforce, both in NSW and other Australian states, is overwhelmingly female dominated with males constituting less than five per cent of all employees (Lyons et al. 2005 ). 13 The rates of pay under awards for children's services staff has been identified as relatively substandard. For example, the 1996 report of the Economic Planing and Advisory Commission concluded: 'Pay rates for child care workers are below those for even unskilled occupations such as shop assistants or care park attendants and are generally out of step with the pay rates for occupations with similar proportions of workers with education and training' (EPAC 1996, 27) . Therefore it should come as no surprise that 'child care' was one of the industries examined in both the NSW and Queensland pay equity inquires (IRC of NSW 1998a; QIRC 2001).
NSW 'child care' pay equity case
Encouraged by the outcome of the Crown Librarian case, the trade union with responsibility for staff employed in long day care centres (excluding degree qualified early childhood education teachers, who are covered by the Independent Education Union), the NSW branch of the LHMU, made an application to the NSW Commission to vary the • female domination of an industry workforce reduces relative wages;
• relative low wages deter male employment into the children's services industry;
• the skills exercised by long day care staff had not been appropriately recognised by employers or industrial tribunals when wage rates were previously established;
• research evidence showed that working with young children is not 'innate' to women, and is a learned skill;
• the skills demanded of long day care employees by the federal government's QIAS are often overlooked and undervalued;
• the chartable and philanthropic origins of the child care industry had ongoing consequences for the low levels of pay fixed by the Award;
• the 'utilisation' rates of long day care centres had increased;
• the federal government's fee relief subsidy under the Child Care Benefit had made child care more affordable for parents, thus increasing the demand for child care; and
• survey data suggests parents place an emphasis on centre quality over costs of child care when choosing a particular centre.
The NSW Commission noted that 'some employer witnesses in these proceedings accepted those views' and that 'child care workers are generally perceived to have low pay and low status' (IRC of NSW 2006, paragraph 200) , and one reason for the relative low pay was some employers 'maximise their profit levels' despite 'the importance to our society of the work which the predominately female child care workers employed in this State perform' (IRC of NSW 2006, paragraphs 201-202 
Queensland 'child care' pay equity case
In 2003 • The occupation of child care fits the profile that indicates undervaluation: child care work is characterised as female, the occupation is usually carried out in small workplaces, there had been a lack of effective work value outcomes, qualifications are inadequately recognised, child care is a new industry with new occupations, and it is a service industry involving 'soft' -traditionally female -skills which have not been properly valued;
• Long day care employees receive significantly less remuneration than workers in many other occupations which have comparable levels of skill, qualifications and responsibilities;
• There has been inadequate recognition given in the Award to many of the skills which child care professionals require in their work because they are characterised as female attributes rather than skills; and
• Award pay rates were originally based on comparisons with rates paid for children's services employees in other Australian states, with no regard for the value of the work relative to other occupations, particularly male dominated occupations.
The QIRC handed down an 'interim' decision on 24 March 2006 (QIRC 2006 . The QIRC found 'the work performed by childcare workers has been historically undervalued based on the gender of the workers', and noted some employers had, in the proceedings, attempted to diminish the value of particular skills exercises by children's services workers. The QIRC held the conditions under which the work is performed had not been adequately taken into account in the past when the value of the work was assessed. Expert academic and professional witness evidence submitted by the LHMU concerning the gender undervaluation of the work was accepted 'without reservation' by the QIRC. However, the QIRC held that achieving pay equity needed to be balanced against the 'public interest' of ensuring children's services is affordable and accessible to parents. Consequently, the QIRC rejected the LHMU's wage claim as being 'excessive' for it would 'put at risk the public interest consideration mentioned above'. The wage increases granted by the QIRC were similar the award wage increases granted by the federal industrial tribunal in the 2005 'work value' case for federal award covered long day care workers. For this reason the award pay increases granted to long day care employees by the QIRC are not as generous as the wage increases granted by its NSW counterpart (see Table 2 ). For employees holding the appropriate academic or vocational qualifications, the pay increases range from about 14 to 29 per cent. 
New Federal Workplace Relations System and Pay Equity
The federal Further, under the new federal system an individual is able to make a complaint to the federal anti-discrimination tribunal (the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission) if her or he believe they have been discriminated against because of the pay of gender based unequal remuneration, and seek an order from the AIRC for equal remuneration to be paid in the future (DEWR 2005, 62) . Consequently, it could be argued that the new federal system pays significant attention to the issue of gender pay equity.
However, section 7C excludes the operation of 'a law providing for a court or tribunal constituted by a law of the State or Territory to make an order in relation to equal remuneration for work of equal value'.
In this context, the way the Work Choices regime deals with the issue of gender pay equity has been subject to considerable criticism. For instance, the ending of the AIRC's ability to convene and decide 'test cases' on employment issues of particular significance to working women and then have those decisions applied to the award system has, according to Pocock and Masterman-Smith (2005) The ability of the Work Choices regime to advance notions of pay equity must be seen in the context of the other changes made to the federal award system, the coverage of state awards, and 'covering the field' for the purposes of equal remuneration. The removal of the AIRC's general award making powers, and the further weakening of the award system, disadvantages more women than it does men. Simply put, the award system protects the wages of proportionally more women than men. Erosion of the award system also diminishes the capacity for centralised determinations to improve the work and family balance, which is a persistent 'drag' on women's lifetime earnings.
The wage fixing system that put Australia at the forefront of equal pay for work of equal Under the new federal system the AIRC is prevented from issuing an order if it would be overall inconsistent with a decision of the AFPC. This limitation fails to address the means through which gender pay inequity can be embedded in systems of wage determination that appear, on the surface, to be fair and equal. For example, women are generally employed in different industries and occupations to men (labour market segregation), thus making it difficult to nominate a male 'comparator group' to demonstrate an earnings inequity. The result of the Amendment Act's pay equity provisions is to individualise remedies for pay inequities, as the AIRC is effectively refrained from making orders that remedy pay inequities on a collective basis. Moreover, Work Choices not only lacks the means to ensure that Australia's international obligations are met but also removes, or excludes, equal remuneration provisions in state industrial relations systems from its operation. Women engaged in paid work access to the state jurisdictions, which have developed new and more sophisticated ways to tackle undervaluation of the work of state award workers (equal remuneration principles), are denied.
Despite the key objective of the new federal system to have agreement making the main way employment is regulated, this emphasis on agreements offers workers almost no mechanism to achieve pay equity. The restrictions the Amendment Act places on making collective agreements, and the effective prohibition on pattern bargaining by trade unions especially, makes it difficult, if not impossible, for unions representing workers employed in female dominated occupations to pursue the issue of pay equity because it would require negotiating more than one collective agreement that seek common wages extending beyond a single business (section 106B of the 2005 Act).
Conclusions and Implications
The recent developments at the state level in Australia are positive steps on the path to achieving gender pay equity. The commissioned case studies and inquiries demonstrate With the operation of the new federal workplace relations system from 27 March 2006 the prospects for further progress to the goal of gender pay equity are limited due to the 'take over' of gender based equal remuneration by the 'national' wage fixing system. While the federal wage fixing law has had since 1994 an 'equal remuneration' provision, no successful application has resulted under this provision due to the requirement to demonstrate direct discrimination in the wage rates of women workers. The new federal laws seek to exclude state industrial tribunals from considering pay equity claims by 'covering the field' for constitutional purposes within the Australian federation's law making authority. Instead, the retention of the 1994 federal equal remuneration provision as the only means to remedy gender pay inequity effectively means that the concept of pay equity in Australia can no longer be remedied on a collective basis. The federal Work
Choices regime is indeed two steps backward on the road to gender pay equity in Australia.
